Illegal immigration and enforcement along the southwest border by Pia M. Orrenius
The U.S.–Mexico border region is
experiencing unparalleled trade and
exchange as cross-border flows of goods
and people continue to reach new
highs. The U.S. border economy thrives
on the daily influx of tourists, shoppers,
workers and immigrants from Mexico.
Approximately 700,000 Mexicans cross
legally into the United States every day
to shop and work, returning at night to
their homes in Mexico.
A much smaller number of border
crossers come illegally. Illegal immi-
grants represent only about 0.5 percent
of total south–north border crossings.
Still, the continuous flow of illegal aliens
over the past 35 years has contributed
to an illegal immigrant population 
estimated at between 7 million and 
9 million people—about 60 percent of
them from Mexico.
As illegal immigration has increased,
so has border enforcement. Between
1978 and 1999, the U.S. Border Patrol
quadrupled in size. The most rapid rise
came between 1992 and 1999, when the
number of agents more than doubled,
from 3,651 to 7,982. Not only is the
number of agents greater, but time
spent patrolling the border grew from
1.9 million hours in 1985 to 8.6 million
in 1999. And since 1970, as a percentage
of the federal budget, enforcement
funds have increased 338 percent.
Other agencies also have a height-
ened presence on the border. The U.S.
Customs Service and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) have
intensified their ports-of-entry in-
spections. And, with the increase in
drug trafficking, the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency and the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco and Firearms maintain 
an increased presence as well.
The expansion of federal government
agencies in Southwest border cities has
brought both social and economic bene-
fits. Between 1983 and 1999, for ex-
ample, federal government employment
increased 400 percent in Laredo and
over 200 percent in both Brownsville
and McAllen. The influx of federal
employees has been an economic boon
to areas often lacking what are
described as stable, high-paying jobs.
Heightened police presence also has
reduced crime rates in cities where
enforcement crackdowns are centered,
such as El Paso and San Diego. In-
creased policing has some negative side
effects, however, and border residents
say these include agents being present
on private property and vehicle stops
becoming routine. Courts are also
clogged with an unprecedented number
of criminal cases because of tougher
penalties on illegal entrants and smug-
glers.
Despite the dramatic increase in
enforcement, the impact on the volume
of illegal immigration is not clear. The
number of illegal alien apprehensions
has not declined. Also, research shows
that the majority of illegal aliens de-
ported to Mexico continue to attempt
crossings until they succeed. Some
observers have concluded that border
enforcement has not deterred illegal
immigration. Other research, however,
shows that increased enforcement traps
workers in Mexican border cities and
prevents them from entering the United
States.
1
This article examines border en-
forcement’s effectiveness through de-
velopments in the smuggling industry.
All other things the same, if enforce-
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be rising smuggler use rates and higher
smugglers’ fees, as well as changes in
border crossing points away from heav-
ily enforced areas.
Rise in Illegal Immigration
Driving Mexico–U.S. migration are
the higher wages and job availability
prevailing in the United States. Under-
developed capital markets in Mexico
are a contributing factor because they
make borrowing difficult for most 
people. In surveys, migrants often cite
the need for capital to start businesses,
build houses, repay loans or pay for
medical procedures as a main reason
for migrating to the United States. The
policy backdrop in the receiving coun-
try also can be important. Laws that
exist but are not enforced, such as sanc-
tions on employers who hire undocu-
mented workers, signal acceptance of
illegal immigration.
Also key to migration is information,
which flows mainly through networks
of family members and friends with
prior migration experience. The Bracero
Program, a guest-worker program in
effect between 1942 and 1964, brought
in about 200,000 workers annually from
Mexico. Braceros established thou-
sands of networks with U.S. recruiters
and employers.
2 When the Bracero
agreement was abandoned, no legal
worker exchange was put in its place.
Hence, a new era of largely illegal immi-
gration ensued.
The new era had a slow start, in part
because of the war in Vietnam and
strong economic growth in Mexico in
the 1960s. But by the early 1970s, Mexi-
can migration to the United States was
accelerating again. Facilitating move-
ment to the United States during this
period was the border region’s in-
creased accessibility. Infrastructure de-
velopment and the growth of twin cities
along the border, such as Tijuana/San
Diego and Ciudad Juárez/El Paso, made
the border more accessible to travelers
from central Mexico.
Before 1930, no major road connect-
ed the Mexican interior with any U.S.
border city. Most roads linking the in-
terior to the border were built between
1940 and 1960. Similarly, commercial
air transportation during these years
expanded dramatically. With these
improvements, travel times were signif-
icantly shortened, thus lowering the
costs of Mexico–U.S. migration.
As a result of the factors mentioned
above—including higher relative U.S.
wages and the expansion of networks
and infrastructure—migration rates
more than doubled between 1965 and
1997. Chart 1 shows the Mexico–U.S.
migration rate constructed from the
Mexican Migration Project (MMP)
3, a
household-based survey. The migration
rate, which is the ratio of migrants to
the total number of migrants and non-
migrants, includes both legal and illegal
trips by working-age household heads.
During the sample period, the likeli-
hood of migrating rises from 3.7 percent
to above 9.6 percent. Sustained increas-
es in migration occurred in the 1970s
and the mid-1980s, with an all-time
peak of nearly 10 percent in 1988.
Border Patrol apprehensions data
are also of interest, although changes 
in apprehensions reflect changes in
both enforcement intensity and the
number of illegal border crossings.
Chart 2 shows the INS apprehensions
time series along with the illegal immi-
gration rate from the MMP data. Appre-
hensions increased from about 21,000
in 1960 to more than 1.5 million in 1999,
with steep increases in the 1970s, in the
mid-1980s leading up to passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act
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SOURCE: Mexican Migration Project.(IRCA) in 1986, and again in 1994–96.
Meanwhile, the MMP rate of illegal
immigration dropped sharply after IRCA,
partly due to the IRCA amnesty that
legalized many migrants in the MMP
survey. Other data, such as those based
on the U.S. Census or Current Popula-
tion Survey, do not show a drop in ille-
gal immigration until around 1991.
4
Evaluating Border Enforcement
U.S. authorities responded to rising
illegal immigration by increasing enforce-
ment. As shown in Chart 3, border
enforcement—measured by the num-
ber of hours Border Patrol agents spend
on linewatch duty—grew in three phas-
es between 1964 and 1999.
5 For enforce-
ment to deter illegal immigration, it
must raise the costs undocumented
migrants face. This is usually done by
increasing the probability of apprehen-
sion but also can occur if the migrant
faces other increased risks, such as the
chance of death or injury. Has 
the probability of being apprehended,
and hence the cost and risk to the
migrant, increased during the enforce-
ment periods under study?
Three Phases of Enforcement
In early enforcement efforts, up until
1986, linewatch hours lagged the in-
flux of migrants. Hours rose in the late
1970s when the Carter administration
increased INS funding, but most new
resources went to hardware and equip-
ment. During the Reagan administra-
tion, IRCA’s passage took INS expansion
to a new level. A large portion of the 
33 percent increase in INS funding was
earmarked for the Border Patrol, and
the effect on linewatch hours is appar-
ent in Chart 3.
At this time, Congress also strength-
ened penalties against migrant smug-
glers and imposed sanctions on employ-
ers of undocumented workers. Whereas
penalties on smugglers and increased
dollars for enforcement were intended
to curtail the supply of undocumented
workers, the employer sanctions were
intended to limit demand by imposing
fines on first offenses and criminal
penalties on repeat offenses.
The third phase of enforcement
started in 1993. The strategy was labor
intensive and marked the biggest
increase in linewatch hours. The objec-
tive was to make illegal immigration
costly by diverting illegal traffic out of
border cities and away from roads and
buildings. Agents took up fixed posi-
tions along commonly used paths 
within urban areas, which, along with
fencing and surveillance equipment,
forced illegal entrants into the brush.
Once in remote areas, they were more
easily spotted and detained by the 
Border Patrol. The strategy was first
implemented in El Paso in 1993 (Opera-
tion Hold-the-Line), then in 1994 in 
San Diego (Operation Gatekeeper) and
Nogales, Ariz. (Operation Safeguard),
and last in 1997 in southeast Texas
(Operation Rio Grande).
The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
of 1996 followed up on some of IRCA’s
provisions by increasing penalties for
illegal entry, alien smuggling and docu-
ment fraud. IIRIRA also mandated a
doubling of the Border Patrol by 2001,
imposed limited judicial review of
deportation orders and established an
income requirement on sponsors of
legal immigrants.
Smuggler Use Rates and Fees
We cannot directly measure changes
in apprehension probability because
the total number of illegal immigrants
crossing the Southwest border is
unknown. Instead, we can look at illegal
immigrants’ tendency to hire smug-
glers, also known as “coyotes,” and the
evolution of coyote prices over time.
Migrants are more likely to hire coyotes
when they perceive a higher chance of
apprehension were they to attempt a
crossing on their own. If coyotes are
more in demand or if risks increase, 
as is the case when criminal penalties
on smuggling are increased, then we
expect coyote use and prices to rise.
Coyote use rates provide some evi-
dence that despite the increasing vol-
ume of illegal immigration, migrants’
costs were rising during the two earlier
enforcement phases. Chart 4 plots the
percentage of illegal immigrants hiring
coyotes in each year. Coyote use rates
increased in 1970 and trended upward
for the rest of that decade. By 1979, more
than 70 percent of illegal immigrants in
the sample were hiring coyotes. After
softening in the early 1980s, coyote use
rates leveled off at a high level during
the IRCA years (1986–90). New highs
were then hit throughout the 1990s.
Chart 4 also shows that despite in-
creasing coyote use rates, coyote prices
were in steep decline until 1994. Median
reported smugglers’ fees fell from $941
in 1965 to $300 in 1994 (constant dol-
lars), suggesting that increases in the
supply of smugglers outpaced the in-
crease in demand. Several factors con-
tributed to the rise in smuggler supply.
First, the border’s improved accessi-
bility through the building of roads 
and expansion of bus, rail and airway
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Chart 3
Border Patrol Linewatch Hours, 1964–99
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SOURCE: Immigration and Naturalization Service.service significantly lowered transpor-
tation costs. Second, free entry into the
industry by experienced migrants also
increased supply. Third, the growth of
the illicit drug trade during the 1980s
attracted more smugglers as well.
As Chart 4 shows, not until the mid-
1990s did coyote prices reverse their
downward trend. This reversal coincides
with the third phase of border enforce-
ment, seemingly the most successful 
to date. Moreover, linewatch hours
(Chart 3) and coyote use rates (Chart 4)
are at record highs, and apprehensions
(Chart 2) are on the rise. For the first
time, widespread anecdotal evidence
reveals that border crossers are being
apprehended with such frequency that
they turn back, giving up on their 
hopes of reaching the United States.
There is also evidence of migrants
trapped in Mexican border cities, un-
able to cross into the United States.
The New Enforcement Strategy
Another telling sign that recent 
border crackdowns are working is the
disruption of long-standing border-
crossing patterns. Today, immigrants
favor crossing points in Texas and Ari-
zona rather than once-popular spots 
in California. Within states, change is
also noticeable. In California, migrants
choose to cross the harsh deserts of El
Centro rather than risk a crossing near
San Diego. In Texas, migrants are less
likely to attempt an El Paso crossing, pre-
ferring to enter the United States farther
south through Laredo, McAllen, Browns-
ville and, most recently, Del Rio.
Interstate Reallocation of Migrants.
From the survey data in Chart 5, we can
see that one-half to three-fourths of all
border crossings between 1965 and
1990 were into California. Following
IRCA, the fraction of California cross-
ings declined and the propensity to
cross into Texas increased. These trends
were intensified after Operation Gate-
keeper’s 1994 implementation in San
Diego, which also led to increased
crossings into Arizona, although that
effect is not evident in the survey data
for these years. The trends suggest that
with the passing of IRCA and later the
implementation of Operation Gate-
keeper, border enforcement in Cali-
fornia became more effective relative to
Texas. Border crossers responded by
shifting to Texas.
Intrastate Reallocation of Migrants.
Within Texas the changes are equally
striking. Chart 6 shows that the in-
crease in Texas crossings beginning in
1990 was almost entirely concentrated
around El Paso. The resumption of
crossings in El Paso influenced the 
decision to implement Operation Hold-
the-Line in 1993. The crackdown re-
sulted in a 75 percent decrease in the
number of El Paso apprehensions with-
in one year. Consequently, apprehen-
sions in McAllen, Laredo and Del Rio
rose steeply during 1995–97. This evi-
dence suggests migrants switched from
heavily enforced crossing points like El
Paso to places farther south, where they
could cross with relative ease.
Border-Crossing Deaths. The new bor-
der enforcement strategy was intended
to eliminate illegal alien traffic from city
centers. The consequence has been to
divert migrants into more sparsely pop-
ulated areas. Illegal immigrants today
cross through inhospitable terrain and
expose themselves to dangerous cli-
matic extremes to a much larger extent
than they did 10 or 20 years ago. Critics
of the border offensives claim that
injuries and deaths along the border are
at an all-time high as a result. The num-
ber of crossing-related deaths in 1999
was an estimated 324, up from single
digits before 1995. Deaths in 2000 are
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believed to have numbered 388. The
Mexican estimate is 430.
Conclusion
In the post-World War II era, bound-
aries between Mexico and the United
States have diminished. A hundred
years ago, the wage differences were as
large as they are today, yet there was 
little migration between the two coun-
tries. Exchange of people and goods 
was limited by distance, the lack of
roads and transportation, a scarcity of
information, and language and cul-
tural differences. After 50 years of large-
scale migration and settlement, today’s
scenario is vastly different. U.S.–Mexico
trade and migration have grown sig-
nificantly. Illegal immigration and the
resultant border enforcement have
been the natural outcome of an inte-
grated labor market divided by an
international boundary.
In the face of increasing illegal im-
migration, enforcement efforts have
had mixed results. Early efforts in the
1970s and 1980s were largely ineffectu-
al. They succeeded in raising coyote use
rates among migrants, which created a
flourishing smuggling industry offering
steadily decreasing fees. The more recent
enforcement initiatives have been more
successful, driving up coyote prices and
possibly discouraging more migrants 
from trying to cross the border. Addi-
tional evidence is the change in mi-
grants’ crossing patterns. When the 
Border Patrol has cracked down on 
one area, migrants have responded by
crossing elsewhere. Unfortunately, as
border-crossing options have been re-
duced, migrants are risking more to
make it to the United States, resulting 
in more crossing-related deaths than
ever before.
The controversy over illegal immi-
gration and tougher border enforce-
ment is being played out along the
Southwest border. While the national
economy benefits from the influx of
workers, the border economy deals
with many of the costs associated with
illegal immigration. Along with the
benefit from increased enforcement
through the influx of relatively high-
paying government jobs and reduced
crime rates comes the price tag associ-
ated with detaining and prosecuting
large numbers of illegal immigrants and
smugglers. An agreement allowing the
temporary yet legal inflow of Mexican
labor would not end enforcement on
the border but would let authorities
concentrate more on drug interdiction
and less on undocumented workers.
Orrenius is an economist at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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